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Dialing While Incarcerated: Calling for Uniformity 
Among Prison Telephone Regulations 
Nicholas H. Weil* 
INTRODUCTION 
The freedom of speech is fundamental, but federal circuits 
disagree on whether the First Amendment applies to prisoners’1 
phone calls. This disagreement is not over whether prisons can 
justifiably restrict speech, but over whether prisoners’ phone calls are 
“speech” at all under the First Amendment. What should be an 
obvious presumption remains an unsettled issue. 
A prison’s typical phone rule falls into one of three categories: 
those that limit calls to a finite list of recipients,2 those that limit the 
 * J.D. (2005), Washington University School of Law; B.A. cum laude, (2000), Harvard 
College. 
 1. I use the terms “prisoner” and “inmate” interchangeably. Unless otherwise specified, 
either term denotes a convicted person living in a correctional facility (“prison” or “jail,” used 
interchangeably), as opposed to a pretrial detainee. Detainees that have not yet been convicted 
almost always receive some greater freedom. See, e.g., Simmons v. Sacramento County 
Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003); Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 
1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Pretrial detainees have a substantive due process right against 
restrictions that amount to punishment.” (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 
(1987))); Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting that pretrial detainee 
prevented from calling his lawyer for four days may have right under First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to be free from unreasonable phone restrictions); Rex Bossert, Arrestee’s Right to 
Phone Calls Is Upheld in 9th Circuit Ruling, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 24, 1997, at 5; S.F. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, Jail Information, http://www.sfsheriff.com/jailinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) 
(“Each holding cell has a telephone. This phone is available for arrestees to make [free local] 
calls to arrange bail, inform family of their circumstances, or to reach the Public Defender.”). 
But see Weld County (Colo.) Sheriff’s Office, Weld County Jail, http://www.weldsheriff.com/ 
wc_jail/wc_jail.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005) (making no distinction between pre- and post-
trial “inmates” and allowing only collect, non-international calls limited to fifteen minutes). 
 2. 28 C.F.R. § 540.101(a)–(b) (2005) (providing that in the Federal prison system, the 
“list ordinarily may contain up to 30 numbers” and inmates may amend their lists at least 
quarterly); see also, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. I, § 314(E)(l)(c), (f) (2005) (limiting 
calls to a list of “up to 20 . . . numbers” and providing that “[c]hanges may be made . . . at the 
discretion of the warden, but no less than once each quarter” and that “[u]pon the request of a 
telephone subscriber, the institution may block . . . the subscriber from receiving calls from an 
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frequency or timing of calls,3 and those that limit the choice of billing 
methods (collect versus direct-dial, or long-distance versus local).4 
inmate”); 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 482.07(3)(c) (2005) (allowing a list of ten non-attorneys); 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, §§ 723.2(a), 723.3(d)-(e) (2003) (allowing a list of 
fifteen, but prohibiting certain categories of people); JORGE ANTONIO RENAUD, BEHIND THE 
WALLS 75 (2002) (describing first-hand the experience of a Texas inmate). 
 3. 28 C.F.R. § 540.100(b) (2005) (providing that in general, inmates may “make at least 
one telephone call each month”); id. § 540.101(d) (“Ordinarily, an inmate who has sufficient 
funds is allowed at least three minutes . . . . The Warden may limit the maximum length . . . .”); 
LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. I, §§ 314(E)(2)(a), (3)(a) (2005) (providing that for minimum- and 
medium-security inmates, “access should be available on a relatively non-restricted basis,” that 
for maximum-security inmates, “[a]ccess may vary by inmate classification,” and that in either 
case, “[a] time limit should be established”); 103 MASS. CODE REGS. 482.07(3)(e), (3)(h), (4) 
(2005) (leaving the subject of access to each facility’s discretion and allowing curtailment for 
disciplinary or security reasons); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, §§ 723.3(b), .5(b)(2), 
(6) (2003) (“Each superintendent will determine suitable time frames. . . . System access should 
be available to as many inmates as possible, but . . . limited in duration based on facility needs 
. . . . No call shall exceed 30 minutes.”); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-130-0020(3), -0060(1) (1999) 
(providing that calls may be terminated for illegal activity or plans for illegal activity, or for 
disruption of facility operation and prohibiting calls between 11pm and 6am); UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE r. 251-702-3(4) (Supp. 1997) (limiting legal calls to thirty minutes per call); WIS. ADMIN. 
CODE DOC § 309.39(3), (5) (2000) (allowing at least one call per month limited to six minutes 
per call, but also providing that more calls are “allowed” and “encouraged” “[w]here resources 
permit”); see also RENAUD, supra note 2, at 75 (noting that calls in Texas facilities are 
scheduled as close as possible to pre-requested time of day, “although many units simply 
schedule all calls between 6 and 9 P.M.” and that calls are limited to five minutes, except on 
holidays, when the limit is three minutes); Madison County Prisoners Lose Phone Privileges, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 5, 2004, at B2 (noting that sheriff cut off phone privileges to 
all detainees while the jail searched for the few inmates who were causing problems). 
 4. 28 C.F.R. § 540.105 (2005) (“(a) . . . Third party billing and electronic transfer of a 
call to a third party are prohibited. (b) The Warden shall provide at least one collect call each 
month for an inmate who is without funds. . . . (d) The Warden may direct the government to 
bear the expense . . . under compelling circumstances . . . .”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. I, 
§ 314(E)(4)(a) (2005) (providing that routine incoming calls are never allowed); 103 MASS. 
CODE REGS. 482.07(3)(a) (2005) (allowing only one-way collect calls); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 10A:18–8.4 (2002) (allowing only collect outgoing calls unless “between incarcerated 
relatives”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 723.3(a) (2003) (requiring calls to be 
collect unless outside continental United States); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-130-0010(1), -0040(3), 
(4) (1999) (allowing only collect and prohibiting three-way calls); UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 251-
702-3(6) to -3(7) (Supp. 1997) (allowing only collect calls and prohibiting incoming calls); 
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 309.39(4) (2000) (providing that calls must be “collect unless 
payment from . . . account is approved”); Telephone Interview with Tim Carman, Correction 
Officer, Middlesex County, Mass. (Nov. 19, 2003) (noting that the jail housing only pre-
sentencing persons allows unlimited calling, except late-night and early-morning calls, to 
anyone on a list of six family and friends, two attorneys, and one clergyperson); see also 
RENAUD, supra note 2, at 75 (noting that all calls in Texas facilities must be collect).  
 Such regulations are subject to exceptions for emergencies and legal counsel. See 28 C.F.R. 
§§ 540.101(e), .103, .105(b)–(d) (2005); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § 05.530(c) (1993) 
(“[The] superintendent may limit a prisoner’s access to a telephone, except to call an attorney, if 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/20
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To justify these restrictions, the prisons point to significant 
misconduct coordinated through phone usage in corrections facilities 
including drug conspiracies and white-collar crime.5 The courts that 
have denied a presumptive right of prisoners to use the telephone do 
not doubt the expressive content of such phone calls; on the contrary, 
prisons fear the expressive content and its capacity for propagating 
crime and unrest.6 When used to connect prisoners to their outside 
friends and relatives, the telephone is an important instrument for 
civilizing and rehabilitating inmates;7 still, some restrictions are 
necessary to avoid abuse.8 
reasonable grounds exist to believe that the prisoner’s use of a telephone threatens the security 
of the facility or the protection of the public.”); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-602.205(2)(a) 
(2000) (allowing calls to a limited list of “10 names and numbers” and prohibiting three-way or 
transferred calls); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 44-2-102 (2003) (granting broad discretion to the 
“principal administrator” except as to monitoring of calls and providing that “[i]nmate initiated 
calls shall be collect unless approved by the principal administrator for the state to pay for the 
call or for charge to inmate account”); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, Pt. I, § 314(E)(2)(c), (3)(c), 
(4)(c) (2005) (accommodating legal calls); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10A: 18–8.5 to –8.6 (2005); 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 723.3(a), (g) (2003); 5 N.C. ADMIN. CODE 2G.0206 
(1994); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-130-0030 (1999); WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 309.39(2)(d) (2000). 
But see Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that if “no 
critical stage of prosecution” has triggered the right to counsel, the prisoner has no right to call 
even his attorneys (citing Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 199 (7th Cir. 
1985) (barring detainee from phone for ten and one-half hours))). 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, CRIMINAL CALLS: A 
REVIEW OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MANAGEMENT OF INMATE TELEPHONE PRIVILEGES 43 
(1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9908 [hereinafter CRIMINAL CALLS]. 
 6. Id. at 12–16. 
 7. In October of 2005, the Federal Bureau of Prisons housed 187,840 federal inmates. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Weekly Population Report, http://bop.gov/news/weekly_report.jsp 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2005). Out of the sixty-three institutions surveyed by the Treasury 
Department’s Office of the Inspector General, forty-five reported that, on the average, each of 
their inmates places more than one phone call per day. CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, at tbl. 1; 
see also OFFICE OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, IDAHO STATE LEGISLATURE, INMATE 
COLLECT CALL RATES AND TELEPHONE ACCESS: OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS HIGH PHONE 
RATES 2 & tbl. 1 (2001), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/ope/publications/ 
reports/r0101.pdf (noting that inmates made an average of ten phone calls per month and that 
the duration of calls averaged eighteen minutes). But see OFFICE OF TELECOMMS., STATE OF 
CAL., INMATE PAY TELEPHONE ACCESS 5 (1997) [hereinafter PAY TELEPHONE] (predicting that 
increased number or availability of telephones would not result in more telephone usage or 
higher revenues because “inmates are already limiting both the number and length of calls they 
make on existing telephones”). PAY TELEPHONE’s analysis predicts that the price of extra 
telephones outweighs the cost of extra phone calls, but this conclusion has nothing to do with 
whether prisoners would talk more if given more phones and more liberal rules. 
 For an example of prisoners’ use of the phone to communicate with clergy, see JOINT 
COMM’N ON PRISON CONSTR. & OPERATIONS, CAL. LEGISLATURE, PUBL’N NO. 1150-S, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Without definable limits to regulation, either prisons spend tax 
money litigating and settling lawsuits, such as that in Washington v. 
Reno,9 or wardens get away with curtailing speech. Neither scenario 
is acceptable. Attaching prison calls firmly to the First Amendment 
and subjecting the institutions to constitutional scrutiny would create 
clear boundaries. The United States Supreme Court should resolve 
the circuit split and the tension between liberty and law enforcement 
by expressly holding that speech is still “free” within prison. 
Though the Supreme Court should affirmatively bring prison 
telephone calls under the protection of the First Amendment, by no 
means should inmates be able to call anyone at any time. In Turner v. 
Safley,10 the Court applied a loosened, rational-basis-type standard of 
scrutiny to the prison context.11 Though Turner did not involve 
telephones, broadening it to cover prison phone calls accords with 
subsequent case law as well as public policy. A bright line rule would 
guarantee prisoners a legitimate opportunity to exercise their freedom 
of speech, while providing that prisons no longer teeter between the 
extremes of disorder and lawsuit. 
This Note considers whether and to what extent the First 
Amendment grants jail and prison inmates the right to make 
PAYPHONES IN PRISON FACILITIES 47 (2001–02) [hereinafter COMM. ON PRISON CONSTR.] 
(statement of Andrew Robinson-Gaither, pastor, Faith United Methodist Community Church, 
L.A.). Robinson-Gaither explained the burdens of the California prison system’s high phone 
rates: 
I may get two to three collect calls a week from inmates. One month, my collect calls 
from prisoners was over $500 a month. 
It’s cheaper to call Africa or Europe . . . . Their hardship is enormous. Prisoners and 
their families live from paycheck to paycheck like many of us. They can least afford 
these calls, but the calls are necessary for the healing of the inmate and the wellbeing 
of the family. An inmate who is in touch with family and friends . . . is less likely to 
return to prison. 
 To add insult to injury, you cannot connect other family members to the call, 
because it is prohibited to do two-way calling features on calls from prisons, creating 
greater financial hardship. In many cases, we are the only link these people have to the 
outside. We need the cost of these phone calls reduced. 
Id. 
 8. See generally CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5. 
 9. Infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text. 
 10. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 11. Id. at 81. 
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telephone calls. Part I frames the circuit split regarding the issue of 
whether prisoners have a First Amendment right to use the telephone. 
Part II discusses the genesis of a lowered standard of scrutiny that 
applies to constitutional challenges in the prison context. Part III 
explains the potential harms of a continuing circuit split, urges 
Supreme Court resolution, and suggests that correction systems can 
unilaterally allow more telecommunication without compromising 
either their budgets or the peace and order of their facilities. 
BACKGROUND 
I. DO PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT AT ALL? 
Before deciding which standard of constitutional scrutiny is 
appropriate, a court must first read the First Amendment to protect 
prison calls.12 The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have 
answered this question most explicitly; the Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
have suggested such a right,13 while the First and Seventh Circuits 
have found none.14 
A. Circuits Endorsing a First Amendment Right to Prison Calls 
In Washington v. Reno,15 the Sixth Circuit upheld prisoners’ 
constitutional right to use the telephone.16 The Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) had begun converting its collect-call system to an 
automated debit-system (ITS).17 Under ITS, federal prisoners were 
able to call only by debiting their own account of phone minutes, 
 12. In the non-prison context, the question is settled: as to the general population, 
telephone usage is protected. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526–27 (2001) (holding that 
the contents of phone conversation, even though obtained illegally, are protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 13. See infra notes 23, 27, 31 and text accompanying notes 16, 23, 27, and 31. 
 14. See infra notes 37, 40 and text accompanying notes 33, 37, 40, 41, and 43. 
 15. 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 16. Id. at 1100 (citing Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984)). 
 17. Id. at 1095; see also Telephone Regulations and Inmate Financial Responsibility, 59 
Fed. Reg. 15,812, 15,812 (Apr. 4, 1994) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.100–.105) (noting that 
the BOP had begun using collect-call systems “[i]n the late 1970’s . . . to increase telephone 
access and reduce staff assistance”). 
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purchased at the commissary.18 Inmates who had relied on their 
families and friends to pay for phone calls opposed the switch to 
debit cards.19 Even after several inmates filed suit to enjoin the 
conversion to ITS, the BOP proposed new regulations which would 
require its exclusive use.20 The district court granted a preliminary 
injunction against further installation of ITS in federal prisons.21 
Deciding whether to overrule the injunction, the court of appeals 
evaluated the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits.22 The 
court agreed that prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to use the 
phone.23 However, it ultimately overruled the injunction, finding that 
the amended regulations were much more likely to pass muster.24 
 18. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1095. Furthermore, ITS automatically blocked any call to a 
number that was not on a list of up to twenty recipients. Id.  
 19. Id. at 1096. 
 20. Id.; Telephone Regulations and Inmate Financial Responsibility, 58 Fed. Reg. 39,096, 
39,096–97 (proposed July 21, 1993) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.100–.106). The Bureau 
of Prisons asserted that the proposed rule would “take advantage of the economies offered by 
the use of a debit billing system . . . and . . . protect the public from possible abuse of inmate 
telephone calls under the new billing system.” Id. at 39,096. An interesting twist: whereas the 
plaintiffs in Washington objected to losing a collect-call system, Johnson v. State of California, 
207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000), involved an inmate with the opposite concern. The plaintiff in 
Johnson alleged that phone rates were too high because the prison allowed only collect calls—
so high as to constitute extortion. See id. at 653, 656. Though the inmate did not allege a First 
Amendment violation, the court stated in dicta that “[a]lthough prisoners have a First 
Amendment right to telephone access, this right is subject to reasonable limitations arising from 
the legitimate penological and administrative interests of the prison system.” Id. at 656 (citing 
Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Chapdelaine v. 
Keller, No. 95–CV–1126, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23017 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1998), at *28 
(holding that higher phone rates alone do not give rise to a constitutional issue); infra notes 27, 
31 and text accompanying notes 26–31. 
 21. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1097; CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, app. 1, at 2. 
 22. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1099–1100. 
 23. Id. at 1100 (“[R]easonable access to the telephone . . . is protected by the First 
Amendment.” (quoting Johnson v. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Nev. 1984)) (emphasis 
added)). The plaintiffs had dropped their due process claim upon the promulgation of the 
amended ITS regulations, id. at 1099, so we can infer that the opinion’s subsequent assertion of 
prisoners’ constitutional rights concerns only free speech.  
 24. Id. at 1097–98, 1103–04 (“Any perceived harm . . . to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
. . . rights has been cured . . . .” (citing Telephone Regulations and Inmate Financial 
Responsibility, 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,812-25)). In particular, the court favorably cited four changes 
to the rule. First, the call-list would permit thirty numbers instead of twenty, and even more in 
exigent circumstances. Id. at 1097–98 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,824). Second, the BOP 
abandoned the requirement that potential callers complete a form which solicited personal 
information, instead requiring the inmate to certify that members of the list were amenable to 
being called, and then warning non-family members on the list that they had been so 
designated. Id. at 1098 (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,824). Third, the BOP responded “to 
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Nonetheless, within fifteen months the BOP had mediated with the 
plaintiffs’ counsel and settled the suit.25 That settlement provided, 
inter alia, that for approximately six years, the BOP would not 
proceed with the installation of ITS.26 
The Ninth Circuit has at least implied that prisoners have a First 
Amendment right to use the telephone.27 In Johnson v. State of 
California,28 a California state prisoner appealed to the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his complaint 
under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.29 He alleged 
that the state’s Department of Corrections had extorted money from 
him by means of excessive telephone charges.30 The court 
acknowledged (in dicta) that “prisoners have a First Amendment 
concerns . . . regarding potential discrimination against indigent inmates” by allowing at least 
one collect call per month to “inmates without funds.” Id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,824). 
Fourth, for those prisoners who participated in the financial responsibility plan, the prison 
would exclude fifty dollars per month from its assessments against a prisoner’s trust fund 
account, a measure meant to facilitate telephone communication under an ITS regime. Id. 
(quoting 59 Fed. Reg. at 15,825). This exclusion was increased to seventy-five dollars pursuant 
to a settlement in Washington, see infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text, and remains at 
that level today. Telephone Regulations and Inmate Financial Responsibility, 61 Fed. Reg. 90, 
90–91 (Jan. 2, 1996) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b)). Non-participants would “‘be allowed 
to place no more than one telephone call every month,’” a slackening of the prior limit of one 
call every three months. Washington, 35 F.3d at 1098 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(d)(10)). 
 25. CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, app. 1, at 3. 
 26. The settlement has expired, and the BOP continues to use the debit billing system, 
now called “ITS-II.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT 
No. 5264.07, at 8 (2002), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5264-007.pdf. ITS-II 
would seem to obviate calling lists, see supra text accompanying note 2, because inmates are 
identified by individual PINs and thus recipients who do not wish to be contacted can easily 
block incoming calls from that inmate. See id. at 12–13. 
 27. See, e.g., Galli, 596 F. Supp. at 138 (“[T]here is no legitimate governmental purpose 
to be attained by not allowing reasonable access to the telephone, and . . . such use is protected 
by the First Amendment.”) (citations omitted). But see Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 
1048 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The genesis of this purported constitutional right to use a telephone is 
obscure.” (citing Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 689 (9th Cir. 1998))). Note that the 
plaintiffs in Galli and the cases it cites for this issue were pretrial detainees. Galli, 596 F. Supp. 
at 137, 139–40. The court apparently read the First Amendment to protect phone usage mainly 
in the pretrial context, and only when “the family . . . live[s] so far away . . . as to make 
personal visitation impractical.” See id. at 138. 
 28. 207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
 29. Id. at 653. 
 30. Id. at 652. 
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right to telephone access,” though it concluded that the rates were not 
so high as so deprive prisoners of that right.31 
B. Circuits Denying the First Amendment Right to Prison Calls 
In Arsberry v. Illinois,32 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that prisoners do not have a First Amendment right to telephone 
access.33 This case examined the Illinois correction system’s practice 
of contracting with only one telephone company for each jail or 
prison and receiving half of the revenues.34 A group of prisoners and 
their families alleged that the resulting monopolistic and inflexibly 
high phone rates violated the First Amendment.35 The court agreed 
that the contractors’ rates were “exorbitant,”36 yet found them at least 
constitutionally innocuous.37 The court distinguished Minneapolis 
 31. Id. at 656; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (dictum) 
(“Prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable security 
limitations.” (citing Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986))). For 
examples of similar holdings beyond the Ninth Circuit, see Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105, 
1108 n.5, 1109 (8th Cir. 1989) (implying that First Amendment covers prison calls); Carty v. 
Farrelly, 957 F. Supp. 727, 742 (D.V.I. 1997) (“Unreasonable restrictions on telephone access 
may violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . .”) (citations omitted); Hutchings v. 
Corum, 501 F. Supp. 1276, 1296 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (“[I]nmates have the First Amendment 
rights to communicate with friends and relatives by means of visits, correspondence and 
telephone calls.”) (citations omitted); Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 
1978), supplemented by and final order at 457 F. Supp. 984 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Murillo v. Page, 
690 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). 
 In Pope v. Hightower, the Eleventh Circuit implied that constitutional infringement was at 
least a prima facie possibility where the plaintiff’s prison had limited inmates to a ten-person 
calling list. 101 F.3d 1382, 1384–85 (11th Cir. 1996). The court nonetheless held that 
“[c]onsideration of the [Safley] factors demonstrates that the . . . calling list . . . bears a 
reasonable relation to legitimate penological objectives” and the list did not violate the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 1385. 
 In Oliver v. Thornburgh, 587 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Pa. 1984), the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to the defendant due to factual insufficiency, but 
suggested in dicta that a prisoner who is actually denied access to a phone has a colorable First 
Amendment claim. Id. at 382–83. 
 32. 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 33. Id. at 564–65. 
 34. Id. at 561. 
 35. Id. at 561, 564. 
 36. Id. at 565. 
 37. Id. at 564. The court reasoned: 
[N]o one before these plaintiffs supposed the telephone excise tax an infringement of 
free speech. . . . Any regulation direct or indirect of communications can have an effect 
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Star & Tribune Company v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,38 
in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a tax on 
newspapers as an illegal abridgement of the First Amendment.39 
Without offering any true rationale, the court held that the “primary 
use” of the phone is not protected speech,40 and that it would be 
“doctrinaire” to fit prison calls into the First Amendment.41 
The First Circuit stated in United States v. Footman,42 in dicta and 
without any express reasoning, that “[p]risoners have no per se 
constitutional right to use a telephone.”43 
on the market in ideas and opinions, but that possibility in itself does not raise a 
constitutional issue. Otherwise the entire tax and regulatory operations of American 
government would be brought under the rule of the First Amendment. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 38. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). 
 39. Id. at 592–93. 
 40. Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 564. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals argued that 
“[a]lthough the telephone can be used to convey communications that are protected by the First 
Amendment, that it [sic] is not its primary use and it is extremely rare for inmates and their 
callers to use the telephone for this purpose.” Id. 
 41. Id. at 565. The court opined that a different constitutional theory might go further than 
the First Amendment argument. Id. For example, the court suggested that “the constitutional 
concept of liberty may encompass a limited right” (i.e., a substantive due process right) to 
family visits, and phone calls “may be the only form of visit that is feasible if the family lives 
far from the inmate’s prison.” Id. 
 See also Israel v. Cohn, No. 00-2105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5610 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2001) 
(unpublished decision). The Seventh Circuit decided Israel only eight days after Arsberry. In 
Israel, the Indiana Department of Corrections restricted inmate calls based on a recipient list, 
see supra text accompanying note 2. It “blocked [plaintiff Israel’s] calls because he had not 
submitted a list for approval.” Israel, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS at **2. Israel sued alleging 
unconstitutional restriction of speech. Id. The court quoted and followed its eight-day-old 
holding in Arsberry, stating that “it is extremely rare for inmates and their callers to use the 
telephone” for First Amendment communication, again offering no further explanation. Id. at 
**5 (quoting Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 564). Note that the Arsberry court dismissed the inmates’ 
suit because “they ha[d] failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as required by the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).” Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 561–62; cf. Perez v. 
Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that as with a statute of 
limitations, the defense may waive a § 1997e(a) argument). The plaintiffs argued that they had 
no recourse within the prison system, but the court followed its own precedent in “reject[ing] a 
‘futility’ exception to the requirement of exhaustion.” Arsberry, 244 F.3d at 562. Had the 
prisoners sought money damages that were “beyond the power of the prison authorities to 
give,” their claim might have given rise to an exception to the futility exception. Id. However, 
these prisoners prayed for injunctive relief, and therefore lacked standing to sue prior to 
exhaustion. Id. 
 42. 215 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 43. Id. at 155. 
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In sum, the federal courts of appeals are doctrinally divided as to 
the First Amendment status of prison calls, but none has applied any 
decipherable reasoning to this conclusion. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY BEHIND BARS: THE SAFLEY TEST 
Even though the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split to 
bring prison calls into the sanctuary of the First Amendment, a lower 
standard of scrutiny reduces the protection accorded telephone calls, 
whether into or out of a prison. In other words, prison officials need 
not fear a Pandora’s Box of unfavorable litigation under a lowered 
standard. 
In Procunier v. Martinez,44 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of rules censoring the content of both incoming and 
outgoing mail.45 The Court refrained from assigning a particular level 
of scrutiny to prisoners’ suits, applying a strict-scrutiny-like test by 
default because the regulations considered in that case implicated the 
rights of non-inmates, namely those with whom prisoners exchanged 
mail.46 The Court left open the question of whether prisoners 
themselves enjoy less constitutional protection. 
Thirteen years after Martinez, the Court decided Turner v. 
Safley,47 which considered a Missouri prison’s rule that barred 
inmates from writing to each other.48 While acknowledging generally 
 44. 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989); see 
also infra note 46. 
 45. The rules “directed inmates not to write letters in which they ‘unduly complain’ or 
‘magnify grievances;’” prohibited “‘letters that pertain to criminal activity; are lewd, obscene, 
or defamatory; contain foreign matter, or are otherwise inappropriate;’” and “defined as 
contraband writings ‘expressing inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or 
beliefs.’” Id. at 399–400 (citations omitted). 
 46. Id. at 409, 413–14. The Court’s two-part test stated that “the regulation or practice in 
question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the 
suppression of expression,” and must be narrowly tailored. See id. at 413. Martinez was decided 
before Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989), which extended the standard to non-
prisoners as well. See infra notes 73–74 and text accompanying note 73. 
 47. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
 48. Id. at 81–82. The regulation exempted correspondence among inmates who were 
family members. Id. at 81. The prison, Renz Correctional Institution in Cedar City, Missouri, 
permitted correspondence “with immediate family members who [we]re inmates in other 
correctional institutions,” and it permitted correspondence between inmates “concerning legal 
matters.” Id. Other correspondence between inmates was permitted only if “the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol19/iss1/20
p427 Weil book pages.doc  2/20/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  Dialing While Incarcerated 437 
 
 
 
that the First Amendment protects inmates,49 the Supreme Court 
ruled that a strict scrutiny standard is inappropriate in the prison 
context because of its chilling effect upon prison wardens’ discretion 
in enforcing order.50 In other words, the Constitution does not 
demand that prisons unreasonably strain their own resources, even for 
the sake of speech. Rather, the courts should defer to the autonomy of 
prison systems,51 and ask whether the suppression of speech is 
“reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”52 The 
Supreme Court laid down a four-factor test.53 The factors are as 
follows: 
First: Is there a “valid, rational connection” between the 
regulation and a “legitimate governmental interest”?54 
classification/treatment team . . . deem[ed] it in the best interest of the parties involved.” Id. at 
82. In practice, “the determination whether to permit inmates to correspond was based on team 
members’ familiarity with . . . [information in] the inmates’ files rather than . . . review of each 
piece of mail.” Id. The rule “as practiced [wa]s that inmates may not write non-family inmates.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 49. See id. at 84 (“Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the 
protections of the Constitution.”); see also Abbott, 490 U.S. at 407; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 405–
06 (“When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, 
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”). Note that neither the 
facts of this case nor the Court’s opinion concerned telephone calls. 
 50. Safley, 482 U.S. at 81, 84, 89. The Supreme Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard 
applied by both the district court, Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 594 (W.D. Mo. 1984), 
and the court of appeals, 777 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1985). Both lower courts had decided 
that the regulation failed the “less restrictive alternative” prong of the strict scrutiny test. 586 F. 
Supp. at 594; 777 F.2d at 1313. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ reasoning, 
noting that “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict 
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to 
adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration.” 482 U.S. at 89. 
The Court reasoned that “‘courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems 
of prison administration and reform.’ . . . ‘[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex 
and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by 
decree.’” Id. at 84 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404–05). 
 51. Safley, 482 U.S. at 84–85. 
 52. Id. at 85, 89, cited in Abbott, 490 U.S. at 409 (“Our task, then, as we stated in 
Martinez, is to formulate a standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is 
responsive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and [to] the 
need to protect constitutional rights.’”). 
 53. For purposes of clarity, I present the factors in a different order than did the Supreme 
Court. Hopefully, the Court will eventually clarify the Safley standard as it is redundant as 
originally cast. See Kimberlin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
(“The remaining Safley factors are largely encompassed by the first . . . .”). 
 54. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). When 
evaluating this factor, the Court considers in particular whether the regulation is content-
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Second: What impact would “accommodation of the asserted 
constitutional right . . . have on guards and other inmates, and on . . . 
prison resources generally”?55 
Third: Under the regulation being tested, could inmates still use 
“other avenues” of expression?56 
Fourth: Is the contested regulation an “exaggerated response” to 
the prison’s concerns?57 
Though the Safley court did not state that any one factor is 
mandatory for a regulation to pass muster, in that case the regulation 
in question satisfied all four.58 Note that only the first Safley factor—
“logical[] connect[ion]”—demands a “yes-or-no” answer.59 The latter 
three factors suggest a sliding scale whereby the more appropriate the 
regulation is on its face, the more deference is granted to its 
enforcement.60 
 Applying the test, the Safley court first found the restriction on 
correspondence to be “logically connected” to the facility’s goal of 
neutral. Id. at 90 (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 551 (1979). 
 55. Safley, 482 U.S. at 90. 
 56. Id. (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977)). 
 57. Id. The Court here contradicted the lower courts’ application of the “least restrictive 
alternative” test: 
[P]rison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable 
alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint. But if 
an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s 
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as 
evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard. 
Id. at 90–91 (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. at 91–93. The Court also briefly discussed “time, place, or manner” restrictions. Id. 
at 88. A government can impose reasonable, content-neutral limitations on the “time, place, and 
manner” of otherwise protected speech. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 176–77 (1998). Though such restrictions are presumed permissible, the Safley 
court agreed with Pell v. Procunier that the restrictions in that case were not “time, place, or 
manner” restrictions. Safley, 482 U.S. at 88. However, the Safley court did note the degree of 
available alternatives to the constrained means of communication. Id. at 93. These two 
concepts—“time, place, and manner,” and “alternative means”—are related, but whereas the 
alternatives factor involves a sliding scale, see id. at 91, “time, place, and manner” is better 
described as an all-or-nothing exception—either a restriction is based upon reasonable time, 
place, and manner criteria and is therefore permissible per se, or it is not. See ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.4 (2d ed. 2002). 
 59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
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barring inmates from associating with each other.61 With respect to 
the second factor, the Court held that granting the prisoners 
unfettered mailing privileges would burden others’ “liberty and 
safety” to such an extent that prisons should be left the discretion to 
refuse that burden.62 That inmates could still communicate in other 
ways with those outside the prison walls satisfied the third factor.63 
Finally, the prisons could not undertake monitoring correspondence, 
a less burdensome solution, without disproportionate cost.64 The 
Court upheld the regulation as constitutional.65 
A. The Safley Test Reaches Through the Bars 
In Thornburgh v. Abbott,66 the Supreme Court followed and 
broadened the “legitimate penological interest” standard by applying 
it to non-inmate correspondents.67 The BOP had promulgated 
regulations allowing officials, at a warden’s discretion, to choose not 
to distribute publications found to threaten institutional security.68 
Furthermore, the BOP would suppress all of a publication that 
contained any excludable portion—the “all-or-nothing” rule.69 The 
Court acknowledged that incarceration does not mean the utter loss of 
 61. Safley, 482 U.S. at 91–92 (“Undoubtedly, communication with other felons is a 
potential spur to criminal behavior . . . .”). 
 62. Id. at 92–93. 
 63. Id. at 92. Note that after Abbott, both non-prisoners and prisoners invoke the same 
deferential standard of scrutiny. See supra text accompanying note 59; infra note 73 and text 
accompanying note 65. As such, if the facts of Safley arose today, the option of writing to non-
inmates would also be subject to limitation by the facility. 
 64. Safley, 482 U.S. at 93. The prison asserted “that it would be impossible to read every 
piece of inmate-to-inmate correspondence,” and thus dangerous mail would inevitably escape 
detection. Id. Furthermore, prisoners could encode dangerous messages in seemingly benign 
language. Id. 
 65. Id. The Court remanded for consideration of whether the regulation was applied in an 
“arbitrary and capricious” manner, but otherwise held that “the regulation does not 
unconstitutionally abridge the First Amendment rights of prison inmates.” Id. at 93, 100. 
 66. 490 U.S. 401 (1989). 
 67. Id. at 413. 
 68. Id. at 403 & n.1, 404–06 & n.3 (citing Control, Custody, Care, Treatment, and 
Instruction of Inmates, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,254 (June 29, 1979) (codified as amended at 28 C.F.R. 
§ 540.71(b) (2005))). Note that this regulation is content-based, in contrast to virtually all 
telephone regulations, which do not consider the actual content of conversations. In fact, the 
regulation considered in Abbott expressly required consideration of the content of each 
publication as grounds for rejection. See id. at 405 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(c) (2005)). 
 69. Id. at 406 n.8. 
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constitutional protection, but reasoned that courts must also consider 
the unique difficulty of prison administration.70 The Court agreed 
with the BOP that unchecked distribution of certain publications 
would create the potential for disorder.71 Overruling Martinez, the 
Abbott court rejected the arguments of the plaintiff-respondents (“a 
class of inmates and . . . publishers”72) that, because non-inmates 
were implicated, a stricter standard was appropriate.73 Instead, the 
Court applied the Safley test.74 
First, the Abbott court concluded that the concerns advanced by 
the BOP were legitimate75 and logically connected to the constraints 
that the prison desired to impose.76 The Court also reasoned that what 
 70. See id. at 407, 413 (citing Safley, 482 U.S. at 84–85, 89) (“In the volatile prison 
environment, it is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent . . . 
disorder.”). The Court determined that even outsiders “have potentially significant implications 
for the order and security of the prison.” Id. at 407. 
 71. Id. at 412–13. The Court reasoned that problems do not arise only from individual 
subscribers, but also out of informal re-circulation once the publication has penetrated the 
prison walls: publications “reasonably may be expected to circulate among prisoners, with the 
concomitant potential for coordinated disruptive conduct.” Id. at 412 (emphasis added). The 
Court also implied that prison regulations may and should protect inmates from retaliatory or 
prejudice-based conduct. Id. at 413 (“[P]ossession of homosexually explicit material may 
identify the possessor as homosexual and target him for assault.” (citing PRISONERS AND THE 
LAW 3–14 (Ira P. Robbins ed., 1988))). 
 72. Id. at 403. 
 73. See id. at 413–14 (noting that to apply different standards to prisoners and non-
prisoners would violate the “reasonableness” standard established by Bell, Jones, and Pell); 
Jennifer A. Mannetta, Note, The Proper Approach to Prison Mail Regulation, 24 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 209, 218 (1998) (noting that some circuits find different 
standards for inside and outside inappropriate). 
 74. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 414. 
 75. Id. at 414–15 (noting that “beyond question,” “protecting prison security” is a 
legitimate penological objective). 
 76. Id. at 416. When considering the “logically connected” prong, the Court first invoked 
the “neutrality” sub-factor that it had emphasized in Safley. Id. at 415–16 (citing Safley, 482 
U.S. at 90). The Court held that the regulations were technically content-neutral—though they 
facially permitted prison officials to consider the actual message conveyed by a publication, the 
ultimate decision to suppress was to be based on the likelihood that the message would cause 
disorder, rather than on the message itself. Id. The Court here contrasted regulations that censor 
particular sets of words either because officials consider their message inappropriate (an 
impermissible criterion), or because officials feel that their message threatens institutional 
security (permissible if the other factors are satisfied). Id. at 415. To illuminate this hairline 
distinction, the Court compared the challenged regulations in Martinez, which apparently 
targeted the extremity of the writing rather than its likelihood of causing disruption, id. at 416 
n.14 (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 415 (1974)); to the challenged regulations in 
Jones, which upheld a policy suppressing materials from prisoners’ union while allowing 
materials from the Jaycees and Alcoholics Anonymous, because the latter “were seen as serving 
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Safley called a “ripple effect”77 would apply in Abbott as well—that 
is, permitting the indiscriminate circulation of publications would 
bring comparable costs to others’ “liberty and safety.”78 As to the 
third factor, the Court applied the concept of freedom of speech 
“expansively,” once more giving great deference to prison officials 
because the contested regulations still “permit[ted] a broad range of 
publications to be sent, received, and read.”79 
a rehabilitative purpose, working in harmony with the goals and desires of the prison 
administrators, and . . . had been determined not to pose any threat to the order or security of the 
institution.” Id. at 415 n.13 (quoting Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 131 
n.8, 134 (1977)). 
 Having established that the regulation was technically content-neutral, the Court added two 
additional subfactors to its “logically connected” inquiry. First, but for the lessened standard of 
scrutiny, some publications might slip through the cracks and “exacerbate tensions,” even if not 
directly causing “disorder.” See id. at 416 (citations omitted). Second, publications are reviewed 
individually, on a case-by-case basis, by the warden; that is, publications are neither delegated 
nor censored en masse according to a list. See id. at 416–17. Note that this “individualized” 
review does not mean that wardens are invited “to apply their own personal prejudices and 
opinions as standards for prisoner mail censorship.” Id. at 416 n.14 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. 
at 415). Rather, “[a] publication which fits within one of the ‘criteria’ for exclusion may be 
rejected, but only if it is determined to meet that standard under the conditions prevailing at the 
institution at the time.” Id. at 416–17 (construing 28 C.F.R. §§ 540.70(b), 540.71(b) (2005)). 
Still, the Court permits broad discretion. “We agree that it is rational for the Bureau to exclude 
materials that, although not necessarily ‘likely’ to lead to violence, are determined by the 
warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder under the conditions of a particular prison at a 
particular time.” Id. at 417. Acknowledging an apparent contradiction whereby an objective 
standard is applied by an individual, interested, human arbiter, the Court argued that achieving 
more uniformity would require more censorship across the board, thereby compromising 
inmates’ “‘alternative means of exercising the right’ in question,” the third Safley factor. See id. 
at 417 n.15 (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 90). 
 77. Safley, 482 U.S. at 90 (noting that the “‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison 
staff” triggers particular deference). 
 78. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 418 (quoting Safley, 482 U.S. at 92); cf. Brief of Respondents at 
47 & n.43, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (No. 87-1344) (“[D]iscarding an entire 
book or publication when only a small portion is objectionable represents the constitutional 
equivalent of ‘throwing out the baby with the bathwater.’ . . . [T]here is no ‘significant ripple’ 
effect on fellow inmates or staff in allowing the inmate to receive the rest of the publication.”). 
 79. See Abbott, 490 U.S. at 417–18. Though the Court did not go into detail in applying 
the facts of the instant case, it followed Safley and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987), by implication. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 417–18. The Court noted that the Safley court held 
“that it was sufficient if other means of expression (not necessarily other means of 
communicating with inmates in other prisons) remained available.” Id. (referencing Safley, 482 
U.S. at 92). The Court also noted approvingly the O’Lone court’s holding that the inmates’ 
opportunity to fulfill other Muslim tenets was sufficient, even if they could not leave outdoor 
work detail to observe Jumu’ah (Friday afternoon prayer compelled by the Koran). Id. at 417–
18 (referencing O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 351); see also Safley, 482 U.S. at 352 (holding that prison 
policies permitted prayer during non-working hours and accommodated Muslim diets and 
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Applying the fourth Safley factor, the Abbott Court held that there 
was “no obvious, easy alternative” to the challenged censorship 
practices.80 The respondents had urged that abolishing the all-or-
nothing rule would provide an “alternative.”81 The petitioners’ brief 
countered that to give prisoners magazines with pages ripped out 
would create even more “discontent” than the all-or-nothing rule.82 
The Court, rejecting the Martinez standard, agreed that the all-or-
nothing rule was not an “exaggerated response.” Because of this, and 
because of the time and labor required to remove objectionable 
material, the Court concluded that the fourth factor was satisfied, and 
that the regulations passed muster under Safley.83 
B. The Safley Test Has Persisted, and Can Apply to Phone Calls 
The “legitimate penological interest” standard has withstood the 
eighteen years since Safley.84 For example, under facts similar to 
those of Arsberry, the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
in McGuire v. Ameritech Services, Inc.85 recently rejected a motion to 
dismiss the claim of “family members, friends, attorneys, and 
bailbondsmen of inmates” that the prohibition on pre-paid calling 
special needs during Ramadan). Following this broad precedent, the Abbott court concluded 
that because the regulation allowed “a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and 
read,” the prison had cleared the alternative-means hurdle. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 418. 
 80. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 418.  
 81. Brief of Respondents, supra note 78, at 47 n.43 (“[T]here is a ‘ready alternative’ . . . at 
de minimis cost, . . . namely, deleting the objectionable portion and providing the rest to the 
prisoner.”). 
 82. Abbott, 490 U.S. at 431 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 419 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 549 (1979)). 
 84. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001); 
Abigail E. Robinson, Comment, Treating the Sex Offender at Any Cost: Fifth Amendment 
Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination in the Prison Context, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 725, 
737–38 (2003). 
 The Seventh Circuit does not require prison systems to assert a defense as to why speech 
restrictions are reasonable, as long as justifications are “self-evident,” even if prophylactic. 
Israel v. Cohn, No. 00-2105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5610, at **5–**6 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 2001) 
(unpublished decision); cf. Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506, 509–10 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that where connection between guard’s “tangentially help[ing] an inmate” and 
“corruption and coercion” was not obvious, “[t]he prison administration must proffer some 
evidence to support its restriction of prison guards’ constitutional rights”) (citations omitted). 
 85. 253 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
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cards violated their (the non-inmates’) freedom of speech.86 The 
plaintiffs argued that, even though prisoners themselves fall within an 
exception to the strict scrutiny test, restricting the prisoners’ 
telephone access nonetheless abridges the rights of those friends and 
family members who would otherwise be able to communicate with 
prisoners.87 The court agreed with the prisons’ view that people who 
talk to inmates are similarly situated as the inmates.88 In other words, 
outsiders put themselves in the shoes of the inmates when they 
choose to call or to be called by those inmates, and cannot rely on the 
strict scrutiny test to override the lowered Safley standard.89 
In Benzel v. Grammer,90 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed an injunction against a Nebraska penitentiary’s calling-list 
policy.91 The court stated that it followed the Safley precedent, 
though it did not explicitly apply any of its factors except to imply 
that mail and visitation served as “alternatives” to telephone speech.92 
Though Benzel involved a plaintiff at a high security level,93 it shows 
that in at least one circuit court, Safley has reached out and touched 
telephone calls.94 
III. A PROPER COURSE OF ACTION GIVEN THE CURRENT LAW 
The Supreme Court has declared that a lower threshold of 
constitutional scrutiny applies to prisoners and to those with whom 
they communicate. Though Safley and Abbott considered media other 
 86. Id. at 992, 1021. 
 87. See id. at 999–1000. As the petitioner was in a state prison system, he sued under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but the court asserted that this distinction 
was “purist,” and that analysis through the First Amendment was appropriate. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1001. 
 89. See id. at 999, 1001. 
 90. 869 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 91. Id. at 1109. The inmate-plaintiff had been segregated into a heightened-security unit. 
Id. at 1107. The challenged policy limited his calls to a list of up to three recipients, none of 
whom could be a “nonattorney, non-family male.” Id. 
 92. See id. at 1108–09. 
 93. See supra note 87. 
 94. See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 389–90 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(implying that telephone restrictions should be analyzed under Safley); Smith v. Bradley, No. 
94-5351, 1995 WL 241996, at **3 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 1995) (dictum) (unpublished decision); 
Azania v. Bayh, No. 93-2094, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 8422, at **5 (7th Cir. Apr. 20, 1994) 
(unpublished decision) (leaving the issue of telephone usage unclear). 
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than telephones,95 some federal courts of appeals have applied Safley 
and Abbott to phone calls,96 and the Supreme Court should make that 
connection universal. Despite their apprehension,97 prison officials do 
not face actual loss of control should the Supreme Court read the 
First Amendment to cover prison calls. On the contrary, officials 
would be able to enforce telephone regulations with even more 
confidence than they do now.98 
A. The Majority of Circuits Is Correct: The First Amendment 
Protects Prison Phone Calls 
In order to apply the Safley test, or any other constitutional 
standard of scrutiny, to prison telephone policies, the Supreme Court 
will first need to resolve the circuit split by holding that prison phone 
conversations receive First Amendment protection.99 Though the 
Safley standard defers tremendously to prisons, the freedom of speech 
remains a bedrock safeguard for even the most recalcitrant felon.100 
So far, the Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to 
embrace prisoners’ use of mail and the internet,101 but not phone 
calls. This dichotomy is improper. 
 95. See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text. 
 96. See also United States v. Reid, 369 F.3d 619, 622, 626 (1st Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 110–12 (2nd Cir. 1998). In Reid, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
implied that the Abbott standard would apply to Special Administrative Measures applied 
against would-be shoe-bomber Richard Reid; however, in the case at bar, Reid challenged mail 
restrictions rather than phone restrictions. 369 F.3d at 622, 626. 
 97. CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, at 120–21.  
 98. In addition to the types of prison regulations discussed in this Note, see supra notes 5–
7 and accompanying text, there are other regulations against abuse of phone calls that are 
already recognized as consistent with the First Amendment. Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 
935, 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding a state statute not unconstitutionally overbroad in 
stating: “(1) It shall be unlawful . . . (b) to make a telephone call, with intent to terrify, 
intimidate, or harass, and threaten to inflict injury or physical harm”) (citation omitted); 
Gormley v. Conn. State Dep’t of Prob., 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1980); Wayne F. Foster, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal Statute Forbidding Use 
of Telephone to Annoy or Harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411 (2003). 
 99. In the non-prison context, the Court has read phone usage into the First Amendment. 
See supra note 12. 
 100. See, e.g., MICHAEL MUSHLIN, 1 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 213 (2d ed. 1993) (“The 
‘Constitution’s most majestic guarantee’ is the free speech clause of the First Amendment.” 
(citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (2d ed. 1988))). 
 101. See Titia A. Holtz, Note, Reaching Out from Behind Bars: The Constitutionality of 
Laws Barring Prisoners from the Internet, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 855 (2002). 
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The First and Seventh Circuits tacitly conclude that prisoners’ 
phone calls are not speech, but provide no reasoning or citation to 
authority.102 Their decisions and the lack of explanation for them are 
unpersuasive. In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s statements in Arsberry 
and in Israel v. Cohn that prisoners “rare[ly]” make phone calls of a 
First Amendment nature103 is bizarre—does somebody, merely by 
being locked up, lose the capacity to speak in a manner deserving 
protection?104 
That inmates may not wear gang symbols or bear arms is 
obviously a necessary abridgement of rights; but to completely deny 
inmates’ right to a basic conduit of speech admits of no justification, 
at least none so obvious that the courts need not explain 
themselves.105 Of course, some checks upon telephone usage are 
essential to keep order, but the most appropriate state is an 
equilibrium between boundless license and arbitrary censorship.106 
B. Prisons Would Not Lose Control Under a Safley Approach 
Supreme Court resolution of this issue would benefit not only 
prisoners and their friends, but also prison facilities. A fear of 
litigation has contributed to overly permissive prison environments, 
 102. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 104. See Israel v. Cohn, No. 00-2105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 5610, at **5 (7th Cir. Mar. 
27, 2001) (unpublished decision); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 564 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 105. For further discussion of the unique importance of First Amendment rights behind 
bars, see, for example, Adams v. Stanley, 237 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D.N.H. 2002) (magistrate’s 
recommendation), approved by 237 F. Supp. 2d 136 (D.N.H. 2003) (“[A] prisoner ‘retains 
those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the 
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.’”) (citations omitted); EDWIN 
POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 7–8 (1983) (noting that First Amendment 
rights “need little explanation” and “[t]hese are our most precious rights that are available to all 
persons including prisoners”); Stanley A. Bass, First Amendment Rights, in PRISONERS’ 
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK: THEORY, LITIGATION, PRACTICE 67 (Michele G. Hermann & Marilyn 
G. Haft eds., 1973) (noting that First Amendment rights are “constitutionally ‘preferred’”); John 
A. Carr, Free Speech in the Military Community: Striking a Balance Between Personal Rights 
and Military Necessity, 45 A.F. L. REV. 303 (1998). But see LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE LAW OF 
SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 151 (2002) (“[T]he real question is not 
whether inmates do or should have constitutional rights, but rather what is the scope of those 
rights.”). Regarding prisoners’ quantity of phone usage, see supra note 2 and accompanying 
text. 
 106. See CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, at 93–94. 
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and while some prison systems preempt too much speech, other 
systems, including the BOP, leniently enforce even the current 
restrictions, inviting abuse.107 Even with definitive First Amendment 
protection, current regulations could still pass muster; what would 
improve from the prisons’ standpoint is their capacity to enforce their 
own rules.108 
1. The First Safley Factor: “Content-Neutrality” 
If tested under Safley, current prison phone regulations—whether 
directing the time of the calls, the cost, or the parties on the other 
end—would satisfy the first factor, content-neutrality, unless a 
prisoner’s calls are truncated due to the subject being discussed. Even 
if a prison does cut off an inmate’s call upon the discussion of illegal 
activity, that reaction could still qualify as content-neutral because, as 
the Court explained in Abbott, partial censorship is meant to bar the 
likely result of certain speech, and not the speech itself.109 
2. The Second Safley Factor: “Ripple Effect” 
Current prison phone regulations should certainly reach the low 
threshold of the second factor set by the Supreme Court in Abbott.110 
In that case, the Court apparently relied on no facts, but merely 
assumed an inverse correlation between the volume of printed matter 
allowed to circulate, and the “liberty and safety” of others.111 The 
longer and wider the compass of prisoners’ speech, the greater the 
 107. A dramatic trend towards leniency began in the 1970s. See id. at 1. According to the 
DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General, unfavorable legal actions such as the settlement reached 
in Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994), see supra notes 23–24 and accompanying 
text, scared the BOP into allowing nearly unchecked phone usage, which may be dangerous in 
light of prisoners’ ability and tendency to abuse the telephone. CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, 
at 94–95. The sheer number of phone calls makes an empirical estimate of abuse difficult, but 
samplings of data establish that, for example, outside parties help inmates circumvent telephone 
procedures by relaying a call, either manually or automatically, to an unauthorized number, 
often long-distance. Id. at 28; see also LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, pt. I, § 314(E)(6) (2005) 
(prohibiting and describing the dangers of “Remote Call Forwarding”). 
 108. See CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, at 94. 
 109. See supra note 68. 
 110. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 111. Id. 
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likelihood of misconduct. Thus, limitations on phone privileges 
should meet Abbott’s ethereal criterion. 
3. The Third Safley Factor: “Alternatives” 
Even if a particular court does not readily permit the additional 
layer of protection of the “time, place, and manner” doctrine,112 the 
“expansive” definition of “alternatives” under the third factor will 
nonetheless endorse prison phone regulations as long as other means 
of communication remain available.113 
4. The Fourth Safley Factor: “Exaggerated Response” 
Some prisons have clearly not satisfied the fourth factor; 
excessive phone rates are an “exaggerated response.” While they can 
certainly curtail speech, the logic of using higher phone rates to 
lessen criminal activity and disorder is not as apparent as the obvious 
effect of restrictions on time or recipient-lists. Prisons and jails could 
take certain steps to improve the fairness of their practices without 
undue cost and permit as much speech as is consistent with 
reasonable order and efficiency. 
C. Outrageously High Phone Rates Are Unnecessary and Easily 
Avoided 
Rules that allow only collect calls or expensive pre-paid phone 
cards114 serve no penological interest, let alone a “legitimate 
penological interest.”115 High phone rates serve no interest but the 
telephone companies’. There is no evidence that prisons allow high 
phone rates as a legitimate “speed bump,” or constraint on the 
 112. The Safley Court refused to apply the doctrine. 482 U.S. 78, 88 (1987). 
 113. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 417–18 (1989) (following O’Lone v. Estate 
of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351 (1987), and holding that allowing a Muslim prisoner to attend an 
“alternate” religious ceremony satisfied the third factor). 
 114. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
 115. COMM. ON PRISON CONSTR., supra note 7, at 29 (statement of Sen. Deborah Bowen) 
(“I see advertisements for a 20 minute phone call that can be had for 99 cents. [A]nd it makes 
me wonder why . . . 11 minutes costs [sic] $4.”), 46 (statement of the Reverend Jalani Kafela, 
pastor, Christian Fellowship, Pomona, Cal.) (“We want all profits above the actual costs . . . 
redirected to community-based reentry management programs.”). 
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number of calls that are placed.116 Of course, prisons and their 
contractors face more expenses than normal local phone service 
providers,117 and to recoup these costs is within the reasonable 
expectations of prisoners and their families. But to allow only collect 
calls, which inevitably carry outrageous surcharges, is groundless.118 
Worse yet, those surcharges, along with the already inflated minute-
to-minute rates, fall upon the families of the inmate, effectively 
punishing them for their association with a convict.119 
High phone rates are an “exaggerated response” so as to weigh 
against the prison under the fourth Safley factor. The prisons have not 
shown that a hybrid of collect and calling-card options would be too 
expensive or difficult to administer. Even in Washington v. Reno, the 
plaintiffs, who actually preferred the collect-calling regime, were 
unusually close to their families and may have disregarded the 
premium they were paying for calls home.120 
 116. Indeed, the contractor phone companies would certainly not recommend or agree to 
rates so high as to drive away business. 
 117. Paul Jennings, President & C.E.O. of Public Communications Services, listed three 
major sources of the high cost of providing service. First, the billing and collection of the calls, 
plus the cost of fraud and customers’ insolvency, can lead to increased costs. COMM. ON 
PRISON CONSTR., supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Richard G. Polanco, Chairman, Joint 
Commission on Prison Construction and Operations) (“[I]f people had to pay for a call up front, 
this wouldn’t be a problem.”). Second, secure technology costing “$10,000 per phone,” also 
increases costs. See id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Deborah Bowen) (“[P]art of the cost for prison 
calls results from costly telecommunications software that . . . prevent[s] inmates from making 
harassing calls to crime victims, police officers, and the general public.”). Third, the 
administrative cost of monitoring calls also increases total costs. Id. at 7–8. Discussing the need 
to “find[] that right balance between rates and commissions,” Jennings inferred that state 
contracts are “heading in the right direction” towards a reasonable balance, including in some 
cases a “dual system,” though “most people in this room would prefer not to see the state get 
any commissions.” Id. at 8, 10–11. 
 118. Indeed, the BOP prefers debit (prisoner-funded) billing rather than a collect system, 
and in fact tried to install an automated billing system in spite of the plaintiffs in Washington v. 
Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994), filing suit. See supra text accompanying note 18. The 
plaintiffs’ position in Washington was unusual in that they preferred collect calls because they 
were women with a particular need to communicate with their spouses and children. CRIMINAL 
CALLS, supra note 5, app. 1, at 1. 
 119. For a discussion of how these policies burden communication, see COMM. ON PRISON 
CONSTR., supra note 7, at 2, 46 (statement of Reverend Jalani Kafela) (“[T]he families of 
offenders have committed no crime. Their only crime is being a family member to someone 
who is incarcerated.”). 
 120. See CRIMINAL CALLS, supra note 5, app. 1, at 1 (“[T]he inmates were a very 
sympathetic group of women concerned about keeping in touch with their spouses and children. 
They were not, in many respects, ‘typical’ BOP inmates.”); cf. Johnson v. State of California, 
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In sum, facilities should invest what little capital may be required 
to ensure that prisoners have a choice of billing method and a choice 
of rates.121 Regulations providing for the disclosure of rates are a 
positive first step,122 but a warning and description of an eventual 
robbery do not vindicate the robbery itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should take the opportunity to mend a circuit 
split by deciding that telephone calls to or from prison deserve at 
least some First Amendment protection. Without the problem of 
different constitutional approaches in different states in different 
circuits, regulations would be held to one degree of constitutional 
scrutiny nationwide. Prisoners and their families and friends should 
be able to call each other as often and as cheaply as is consistent with 
prisons’ unique administrative demands. 
As a practical matter, prisons would not need to ease their own 
enforcement of phone restrictions because the Safley line of cases has 
created a deferential standard of constitutional scrutiny. If anything, 
prison officials would gain leverage to avoid lawsuits and 
settlements. But while they enjoy great autonomy, prison officials 
should nonetheless improve their own practices, at negligible cost, in 
the interest of fairness. Under the current regime, prisons, jails, and 
207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000) (challenging high rates). 
 121. See ROBERT E. CEFAIL, EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT INMATE PHONES 
10 (1993) (“Correctional phone systems are certainly a good source of revenue, but . . . is it 
worth it if the phones create tension, inmate complaints or service headaches? More tension for 
administrators, sheriffs and guards? I don’t think so.”). Of course, competitive bidding should 
theoretically ensure that the best-value company is selected to offer service, but even within a 
particular company, a range of rates is usually available. At a 2002 public meeting, California 
legislators encouraged discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of collect-calling 
versus direct-dialing. See COMM. ON PRISON CONSTR., supra note 7, at 2–3 (statement of Sen. 
Richard G. Polanco). 
 122. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.710 (2005). This provision states: 
(a) Each provider of inmate operator services shall: (1) Identify itself and disclose . . . 
to the consumer, at no charge and before connecting any interstate, non-access code 
operator service call, how to obtain the total cost of the call . . . either, at the option of 
the provider . . . by dialing no more than two digits or by remaining on the line. . . (2) 
Permit the consumer to terminate the telephone call at no charge before the call is 
connected . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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their telephone contractors are taking advantage of a captive 
audience. 
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